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Terrorism in Europe
The French Veterans of Globalized Jihad
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Sciences Po, Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA)
Today there is surely not a single United Nations 
member state without nationals enrolled in Daesh, 
the very poorly-named “Islamic State.” In a field 
where it is illusory to expect reliable data, evaluation 
of US intelligence can provide a guideline for ana-
lysing a trend rather than being taken at face value. 
In any case, American intelligence sources estimat-
ed that in 2015, Daesh had 30,000 foreign fighters 
from over one hundred countries, in contrast to half 
that number a year earlier.
Beyond the figures, this estimate reveals a jihadi re-
cruitment dynamic on a world-wide scale that has 
experienced exponential growth. This dynamic is 
fundamentally fuelled by the flaws of anti-Daesh mo-
bilizations, which often do nothing more than accen-
tuate the threat instead of combating it effectively. 
Thus in August 2013, America’s backing down after 
Obama committed to strike Assad allowed jihadi 
propaganda to hammer home the message that the 
chemical bombardments of Damascus were the 
fruit of a vast conspiracy associating Moscow, 
Washington DC and Europe.
The result was an acceleration of those travelling to 
Syria to “take up jihad,” since the country was easily 
accessible from Turkey. For the first time in the history 
of jihad, images of the victims of Assad’s gas shelling 
served as an argument for “humanitarian” recruitment 
in the name of solidarity with the Syrian people, who 
had been abandoned by all. The reality on the ground 
was entirely different, of course, with tension be-
tween Daesh and the revolutionary forces escalating 
to the point of open confrontation in January 2014, 
when the jihadists were expelled from the provinces 
of Aleppo and Idlib in the northwest of the country.
The second rupture in the recruitment curve oc-
curred in the summer of 2014: the proclamation of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s “caliphate” based in Mosul, 
Iraq’s second city, effectively left the United States 
indifferent, until the ordeal of an American hostage 
led the White House to mobilize a “coalition” against 
Daesh. The strictly aerial campaign undertaken in 
Iraq, then Syria, proved counter-productive in the 
long run: only military action on the ground can in-
flict a substantial defeat on Daesh, while the losses 
arising from air raids are largely compensated by 
soaring international recruitment (we saw how for-
eign “volunteers” went from 15 to 30,000 in the first 
year of the air raid campaign).
And finally, Russia’s massive offensive in Syria as of 
September 2015 has led to an unprecedented rise in 
the number of those “taking up jihad.” This bombard-
ment campaign, which has taken a heavy toll on the 
civilian population, only marginally aims at Daesh tar-
gets, so focussed is it on defending the Assad re-
gime and thus on destroying revolutionary positions. 
The anti-Assad groups are the only ones also reso-
lutely committed to the struggle against Daesh, 
which Assad and his regime have constantly handled 
with kid gloves, going as far as handing over the oa-
sis of Palmyra to them in May 2015. To make matters 
worse, the crusade rhetoric in vogue in Moscow, with 
the Orthodox Church blessing Russian bomber air-
craft, cannot but encourage jihadi propaganda.
In Daesh’s globalized recruitment process, the er-
rors of states and “coalitions” intended to fight the 
organization play a decisive role. Jihadi propaganda 
has moreover attained an impressive degree of so-
phistication, with personalized messages sent to 
potential recruits unearthed on social networks be-
fore they are approached more physically. The dis-
semination of communiqués, brochures and videos 
in various languages, with or without subtitles, is 
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part of this world-wide campaign. Just as there is no 
longer a standard profile, there is likewise no longer 
a priority target country either. It is a global phenom-
enon that actually teaches us more about the world 
we live in than about Daesh itself.
Al-Qaeda organized its foreign “volunteers” by na-
tionality, with a guesthouse (madhafa) for them in Pa-
kistan and a specific training camp in Afghanistan. 
Daesh, on the other hand, is organized on a linguistic 
basis, with Arabic-speaking, Anglophone, Franco-
phone and Russian-speaking sectors and centres. 
Daesh’s Arabic “contingent” is by far the largest, with 
a major presence of Saudi Arabians, Jordanians, Tu-
nisians and Libyans. These Arab jihadists are not only 
engaged in the commission of terrorist attacks in 
their countries of origin, but also in the consolidation 
of the Daesh “branches” in Yemen, Egypt and Libya.
Jihadi propaganda has moreover 
attained an impressive degree of 
sophistication, with personalized 
messages sent to potential recruits 
unearthed on social networks before 
they are approached more physically
The approximatively five thousand European jihad-
ists, with all nationalities taken together, can be 
scheduled, when necessary, to perpetrate attacks in 
their countries of origin or neighbouring ones: the 
French-Belgian corridor, already patent in the May 
2014 attack against the Jewish Museum in Brussels, 
was tragically confirmed in the November 2015 mas-
sacres in Paris and Saint-Denis, often with connec-
tions to Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
However, European jihadists, the majority of whom 
do not speak Arabic, play an essential role in popula-
tion control in Syria, where Daesh is perceived as an 
occupying army (as opposed to Iraq, where the Shiite 
sectarianism of the Baghdad authorities has rejected 
part of the Sunni community under Daesh control).
This is why Daesh goes to substantial lengths to en-
list Europeans, destined to marry jihadists of the 
same language and/or nationality. Often more ideolo-
gized than their colleagues, these militants accentu-
ate social and linguistic alienation in a family cell 
wholly controlled by the totalitarian Daesh organiza-
tion. A French “volunteer” who married a Syrian 
would undoubtedly eventually grasp the magnitude 
of the oppression inflicted by Daesh on the local Ara-
bic populations, though Sunni. But conjugal confine-
ment with these jihadi “comfort women” aggravates 
the indoctrination logic and orientates their violence 
against Syrian populations (pillage, rape and plun-
dering are legitimized in the name of a supposed “Is-
lamic” law of loot, facilitating jihadi recruitment of 
many more or less reformed delinquents).
It was estimated that in early 2016, some 600 French 
citizens were fighting among the ranks of Daesh, es-
sentially in Syria. If there is a French peculiarity, it is 
perhaps the fact that a quarter to a third of them are 
converts. It was, in fact, a convert from La Réunion, 
Fabien Clain, who claimed authorship of the first 
13 November 2015 attacks. In any case, it is quite 
possible that countries other than France are also 
experiencing jihadi recruitment of converts though 
not yet aware of it... Daesh’s “francophone” logic 
leads these French people to enter joint units with 
francophone Maghrebi and Belgians (whose mem-
bership in Daesh is estimated at 270).
Jihadi propaganda can opportunistically brandish dif-
ferent reasons for its terrorist ruthlessness against 
France over the course of 2015. No-one should fall 
into the cynical trap of these brainwashing tactics, 
which aim to inculpate the victims to the greater glory 
of the executioners. The truth is that France was at-
tacked for its Republican model, for what it is and not 
for what it does. The more or less harmonious coex-
istence in France of the largest Jewish community in 
Europe and the largest Muslim population on the 
continent, all within a secular framework, is in itself 
unbearable for Daesh.
France also paid a high price for the line it has con-
sistently followed in Syria, dismissing Assad and 
Daesh and opening an alternative, revolutionary third 
track for the Syrian people. In this regard, the 13 No-
vember 2015 attacks aimed as much to trigger a spi-
ral of intercommunity violence as to push France into 
military escalation in Syria. French society has not 
given in to these provocations, despite their unbri-
dled violence, and Paris, while intensifying its air 
strikes against Daesh in Syria, has not yielded to the 
temptation of a “Holy Alliance” with Russia nor en-
gagement of troops on the ground. Daesh’s attempt 
to blackmail France can thus be largely considered a 
failure, at least at this stage.
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The least analyzed dimension, however, lies in the 
presence of French “veterans” in the jihadi hierarchy 
whom some believe have participated in all the or-
ganization’s stages of development, from the group’s 
transformation from the Movement for Oneness and 
Jihad into al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch in 2004, to the ad-
vent of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ten 
years later, designated by the Arabic acronym of 
Daesh. These French “veterans” harbour an obses-
sive hostility against their country of origin, where 
they have often spent long years in prison.
The key figure in the shadow world is the French-
Tunisian Boubaker al-Hakim. Born in Paris in 1983, 
he moved to Damascus in July 2002, officially to 
study Arabic. In reality, he was hosted by Bashar al-
Assad’s intelligence service, which in Arabic is ge-
nerically called the Mukhabarat. It was with their as-
sistance that al-Hakim secretly sojourned in Iraq, 
before returning to France in January 2003. In fact, 
Assad and Saddam Hussein, both Baathists, shared 
some of their clandestine resources to deal with the 
imminence of an American invasion of Iraq, which 
the Syrian dictator feared would be but a first step 
towards the destabilization of his own country.
Boubaker al-Hakim returned to Iraq in March 2003 
and joined the “Arab Legion” of volunteers mobilized 
for the defence of the Baghdad regime. Interviewed 
by the French media, he invited his “buddies” from 
Buttes-Chaumont, the large park in north-eastern 
Paris, to join him in combating the American invad-
ers. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, he went into 
hiding with the support of both the Syrian and Iraqi 
Mukhabarat. This experience is all the more impor-
tant, since these Mukhabarat were trained in the So-
viet School of the most unbridled violence and the 
most insidious indoctrination. 
Al-Hakim returned to France to establish the Buttes-
Chaumont network, as it was called during his trial. 
He recruited his brother Redouane and some “bud-
dies” such as Peter Cherif and Mohamed el-Ayouni, 
before assisting in their transfer to Iraq via Damascus. 
From March to August 2004, Boubaker al-Hakim so-
journed in the anti-American guerrilla stronghold that 
Fallujah, in western Iraq, had become. Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of the Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad, was joined by many former Iraqi 
Mukhabarat agents. It was on this amalgamation of ji-
hadi subversion and Baathist terror that al-Qaeda in 
Iraq and its “management of savagery” (in Arabic, 
Idârat al-tawahhush, which is the title of what is likely 
the organization’s most popular manual) was based.
The French “volunteers” paid a heavy price for this anti-
American jihad in Iraq: Redouane al-Hakim was killed 
in an air raid, Mohammed al-Ayouni lost an eye and an 
arm in an explosion, Peter Cherif was imprisoned after 
the fall of Fallujah in November 2004. But the aura of 
Boubaker al-Hakim emerged bolstered in the circle 
of his Buttes-Chaumont “buddies”, in particular the 
brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi. In January 2005, 
the French police dismantled the Buttes-Chaumont 
network: al-Hakim, whose extradition France finally ob-
tained from Syria, was sentenced to seven years in 
prison, Mohamed el-Ayouni and Cherif Kouachi each 
received a three-year sentence, while Said walked. 
Just as al-Hakim remained the mentor of the network, 
el-Ayouni, who had paid the price of his engagement in 
Iraq with his flesh, became a model for Salim Bengha-
lem, the delinquent sharing his prison cell.
The least analyzed dimension, 
however, lies in the presence of 
French “veterans” in the jihadi 
hierarchy whom some believe have 
participated in all the organization’s 
stages of development
While the Buttes-Chaumont militants were in prison, 
the French police dismantled another “network” in 
2007, also dedicated to sending jihadists to Iraq via 
Syria. It was called the Artigat network, due to the 
central role of this village and the farm there run by a 
Syrian Islamist, Abdelilah Dandachi, who changed 
his name to Olivier Corel when he was naturalized a 
French citizen. This network included Fabien Clain 
(who was to claim Daesh as the author of the No-
vember 2015 attacks in Paris) and Sabri Essid (who 
would receive numerous visits from his stepbrother, 
Mohamed Merah, killed in March 2012 in Toulouse 
after having assassinated three soldiers and carried 
out a bloody attack on a Jewish school).
Freed in January 2011, Boubaker al-Hakim went to 
Tunisia, where a popular uprising overthrew the Ben 
Ali dictatorship. He placed himself at the service of 
Abou Iyad (real name Seifallah Benhassine), who at 
that time launched the Salafist movement of Sup-
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porters of Islamic Law (Ansar al-Sharia/AS). Al-
Hakim patiently organized the clandestine, armed 
branch of AS, largely responsible for the assault on 
the US Embassy in September 2012 (the police 
were overwhelmed and it was the presidential guard 
itself that broke up the riot, which could explain the 
suicide attack in Tunis against said presidential 
guard, just after the November 2015 Paris attacks).
In 2013, al-Hakim was responsible, indirectly in Feb-
ruary, directly in July, for two political assassinations 
that nearly derailed the democratic transition in Tuni-
sia. The manoeuvre failed due to the quadripartite 
mediation between nationalists and Islamists by a 
Quartet whose accomplishment was crowned by 
the Nobel Peace Prize. Al-Hakim saw his Tunisian 
plans crumble and he returned to Daesh under the 
pseudonym of Abou Mouqatel. For Baghdadi and 
his partisans, al-Hakim is a major asset in their strat-
egy of francophone subversion and expansion in Tu-
nisia, or even Libya (where Ansar al-Sharia set up 
some training camps close to the Tunisian border).
In January 2015, the attack on the Charlie Hebdo of-
fices by the Kouachi brothers clearly bore the mark of 
Boubaker al-Hakim, even if authorship was initially at-
tributed to al-Qaeda in Yemen, both to cloud the is-
sue and to bolster Daesh in its aggressive bid to take 
over the entire jihadi galaxy. Two months later, the at-
tack on the Bardo Museum, where some twenty for-
eign tourists were assassinated, demonstrated that 
Daesh, inspired by al-Hakim, was developing a coor-
dinated campaign against secular France and demo-
cratic Tunisia, both held up to public jihadi contempt.
On 26 June 2015, a Tunisian terrorist who had 
trained in a Libyan Ansar al-Sharia camp, massa-
cred 39 people in Sousse, the majority of them Brit-
ish tourists, while a French jihadist, after having tor-
tured his employer, nearly caused a chain of 
explosions at a chemical site in Isère. Again, Bou-
baker al-Hakim’s signature was evident in the plan-
ning of this double attack, while Daesh struck on the 
same day in Kuwait and Yemen. The aim is to spread 
such terror through savagery (tawahhush) that it be-
comes staggering, undermining the defences of the 
country and society under attack.
Boubaker al-Hakim readily speaks in jihadi groups 
about this “savagery,” which he claims effective, in 
both France and Europe in general: “Kill anyone. All 
the infidels over there are targets. Do not wear your-
selves out seeking difficult targets. Kill whoever you 
can among the infidels.” Such instructions could not 
reflect better the savagery shown by the assassins of 
eastern Paris and the Stade de France on 13 Novem-
ber 2015. And we have seen how, as with the Charlie 
Hebdo/Bardo sequence, another attack did not fail 
to follow the French carnage, this time in Tunisia.
Boubaker al-Hakim’s exact position on Daesh’s or-
ganizational chart is imprecise, mainly because said 
chart is largely unknown. It would seem, in any case, 
that it is Salim Benghalem, a follower of one of his 
disciples, who had himself been “jihadized” by Mo-
hamed al-Ayouni, who is in charge of welcoming 
Daesh’s francophone volunteers. Insofar as Fabien 
Clain, his function in the Daesh propaganda ma-
chine is backed by that of another “veteran” in the 
Artigat network, Sabri Essid, who appears in at 
least one execution video.
The role of these French jihad “veterans” over the 
course of more than a decade, the assistance they 
have had from the Syrian services and the former 
Iraqi Mukhabarat, the terrorist triangle thereafter ap-
pearing between Syria-Iraq/Tunisia-Libya/France-
Belgium, the explicit, infectious violence of jihadi 
propaganda in French, the role played by European 
auxiliary “volunteers” in the jihadi occupation of the 
Syrian section of the Euphrates River valley,… all of 
these considerations seem well removed from the 
French debates on schools, prisons or the suburbs. 
This does not detract from the importance or legiti-
macy of these debates. It would, however, be wise to 
resituate this unprecedented threat in all the depth 
of its double context—historical and geographic.
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